Founders discover post-term-sheet that their lead investor's fund is in final deployment and can't do pro-rata in Series B

A B2B founder signs a term sheet with a fund that's investing out of Fund III, not realizing the fund is in its final 18 months of deployment with only 15% of committed capital remaining. So what? The fund can lead the Series A but has structurally zero capacity for follow-on investment in Series B, meaning the founder will lose their lead investor's pro-rata participation at the next round. So what? When Series B investors see that the Series A lead isn't following on, they interpret it as a negative signal — 'the insider who knows most isn't doubling down.' So what? The founder must spend extra cycles explaining that it's a fund lifecycle issue, not a conviction issue, but most Series B leads won't fully believe this explanation because it's the same story struggling companies tell. So what? The Series B gets priced 15-20% lower than it would have if the lead were participating, directly destroying founder equity value. So what? The founder now faces a choice between accepting the lower valuation or waiting for the lead to raise Fund IV (which might take 12-18 months and isn't guaranteed), during which time they might run out of runway. This problem persists structurally because VCs are not required to disclose their fund's remaining deployment capacity during term sheet negotiations, LPs consider fund lifecycle information confidential, and founders don't know to ask — and even if they do, the question is considered gauche.