Counter-Drone Systems Cannot Scale from Single Threats to Swarms

Military counter-drone (C-UAS) technology has a fundamental scaling problem: systems designed to detect and neutralize a single small drone fail catastrophically when facing dozens or hundreds simultaneously. The Pentagon has begun purchasing some defenses designed for small drones, but stockpiles of cost-effective interceptors remain far too small. There is no integrated architecture that ties sensors, effectors, and battle management into a single defensive system that can flex from a lone reconnaissance drone to a coordinated swarm attack. This matters because adversaries are already deploying drone swarms operationally. Iran launched 170 drones in its April 2024 attack on Israel. Russia deploys 30-50 autonomous strike drones daily. The cost asymmetry is devastating: an attacker can saturate defenses with $500 FPV drones while defenders spend $100,000+ per interceptor missile. If you cannot defeat swarms cheaply, you cannot defend fixed military installations, ships, or forward operating bases against the most common weapon on the modern battlefield. The problem extends beyond technology to training and authority. The Joint C-sUAS University at Fort Sill is undermanned and cannot train all personnel who need it. The Pentagon Inspector General found that confused DOD policies meant some U.S. military bases could not adequately respond to drone incursions over their own facilities. Drone overflights of American military installations have jumped considerably in recent years, and base commanders lacked clear guidance on what they were authorized to do. The structural reason this persists is bureaucratic fragmentation. Counter-drone responsibility is split across services, agencies, and commands with no single authority. The FY2025 NDAA finally created a new counter-drone office with veto power over service programs, but the office is still standing up. Meanwhile, the threat evolves monthly while procurement cycles take years.