China and Russia Have Operational Anti-Satellite Kill Capabilities

China demonstrated direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) capability in 2007 by destroying its own Fengyun-1C satellite, then tested a geosynchronous-orbit ASAT weapon in 2013. Russia tested its Nudol direct-ascent ASAT system in November 2021 by destroying its own Cosmos 1408 satellite, generating over 1,500 trackable debris fragments. The Secure World Foundation's 2025 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report documents counterspace development programs across 12 countries, with China and Russia fielding the most advanced kinetic, electronic, and cyber capabilities. The reason this matters goes well beyond losing a single satellite. U.S. military operations depend on a relatively small number of high-value satellites for missile warning, nuclear command and control, and GPS. Destroying even a handful of these assets could blind the U.S. to an incoming nuclear strike, sever communications between command authority and deployed forces, and negate the precision warfare advantage that has defined American military doctrine since the 1991 Gulf War. The asymmetry is devastating: a single ASAT missile costing tens of millions of dollars can destroy a satellite worth billions. This threat persists because there is no enforceable international treaty banning ASAT weapons. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits placing nuclear weapons in orbit but says nothing about conventional kinetic kill vehicles. Diplomatic efforts to establish norms have stalled repeatedly at the UN. China and Russia voted against a 2022 UN resolution calling for a moratorium on destructive ASAT testing. The structural incentive is clear: space-based assets are the Achilles' heel of U.S. military power, and adversaries have every reason to develop the cheapest possible way to neutralize them.